States Empowering Plaintiff Cities by Savit, Eli
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 52
2019 
States Empowering Plaintiff Cities 
Eli Savit 
University of Michigan Law School, esavit@umich.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Litigation Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory 
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Eli Savit, States Empowering Plaintiff Cities, 52 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 581 (2019). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol52/iss3/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
STATES EMPOWERING PLAINTIFF CITIES
Eli Savit*
ABSTRACT
Across the country, cities are becoming major players in plaintiff’s-side
litigation. With increasing frequency, cities, counties, and other municipalities are 
filing lawsuits to vindicate the public interest. Cities’ aggressive use of lawsuits, 
however, has been met with some skepticism from both scholars and states. At 
times, states have taken action—both legislative and via litigation—to preempt 
city-initiated suits.
This Article contends that states should welcome city-initiated public-interest
lawsuits. Such litigation, this Article demonstrates, vindicates the principles of 
local control that cities exist to facilitate. What is more, a motivated plaintiff city
can accomplish public-policy goals that are important not just to the city, but to 
the state as a whole.
Accordingly, this Article contends, states should do more than just tolerate city-
initiated litigation: States should actively encourage it. Towards that end, this 
Article sketches out a path through which states can remove some of the legal
barriers plaintiff cities frequently face. Specifically, states can provide cities the 
authority to enforce state laws (such as state consumer-protection laws). In 
addition, states can and should delegate to cities standing to sue as parens
patriae—that is, on behalf of the people of the state. This Article is the first piece 
of scholarship to flesh out a theory under which states can delegate their parens
patriae authority. And importantly—particularly in era of gerrymandered districts 
that dilute cities’ legislative power—this Article is also the first to argue that state 
delegation to cities can be effectuated not just through a state legislature, but by a 
motivated state attorney general.
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INTRODUCTION
For progressive city governments, it is the best and the worst of 
times. On the one hand, many American cities1—no longer con-
tent merely to provide basic municipal services such as trash 
pickup and snow removal—are acting assertively to protect their 
residents’ interests. Across the country, cities are enacting bold, 
public interest-minded reforms and policies. Cities have played a 
lead role in raising the minimum wage;2 enacting laws which pro-
tect vulnerable minority populations;3 and passing ordinances pro-
tecting the environment.4 Cities, moreover, are amplifying their 
voices on the national stage. It is not uncommon, for example, for 
cities to “pass regulations about national social issues,” “agree to 
international protocols,” and collaborate with other cities to share,
lobby, and litigate.5
Yet even as cities move assertively to protect their residents, state 
governments are clipping their authority to do so. Many states have 
1. Although this Article repeatedly refers to “cities,” that reference should be read to 
be inclusive of all forms of local government—towns, counties, villages, and the like.
2. See, e.g., Julia Horowitz, Here’s Where the Minimum Wage Is Going Up in 2018, CNN
(Dec. 29, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/29/news/economy/2018-minimum-
wage-increases/index.html.
3. See, e.g., Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender Iden-
tity, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/resources/cities-and-counties-with-non-
discrimination-ordinances-that-include-gender.
4. See, e.g., Kat Stafford, Detroit Council Approves Pet Coke Ordinance Despite Industry 
Pushback, 2 ‘No’ Votes, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.freep.com/
story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2017/10/31/detroit-pet-coke-regulations/817246001/.
5. Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1286 (2018).
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passed laws that preempt cities from raising revenue, from enact-
ing anti-discrimination ordinances, and from regulating dangerous
products such as firearms.6 This trend towards state preemption of 
city policies has led one commenter to conclude that city-state rela-
tionships in the United States are at an “all-time low.”7
The push-pull between cities and states is also reflected in the lit-
igation arena. Progressive-minded cities are increasingly launching 
lawsuits, an area that was long seen as the province of states. Cities 
have traditionally been defendants in civil litigation, but many 
“have resolved to become ‘so much more than that.’”8 In cases in-
volving the public interest, cities now regularly act as plaintiffs, fil-
ing lawsuits to protect consumers,9 enforcing environmental pro-
tections,10 and vindicating civil rights.11 The legal theories at issue 
in such lawsuits vary widely. At their core, though, the suits share a 
common characteristic: local governments are suing not just to 
protect their proprietary interests, but to further the well-being of 
their residents. 
Here, too, the relationship between states and cities is occasion-
ally fraught. To be sure, many states support city participation in 
public-interest lawsuits and ally with city attorneys in major cases.12
Yet not all states are as welcoming. Some state legislatures have 
bound the hands of city attorneys by prohibiting them from engag-
ing in certain types of lawsuits against certain defendants.13 In oth-
er instances, state attorneys general—seeking to sue the same de-
fendants—have preempted cities from pursuing their own, 
separate claims.14 And some state officials, like some scholars, have 
expressed unease with the new wave of city-initiated lawsuits.
6. NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN AN ERA OF PREEMPTION 3 (2017),
http://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-02/NLC%20Preemption%20Report%202017.pdf.
7. Chris Teale, State v. City Government: A Relationship at an ‘All-Time Low’?, SMART 
CITIES DIVE (July 2, 2018), https://www.smartcitiesdive.com/news/state-vs-city-government-
relationship-an-all-time-low/526792/.
8. Swan, supra note 5, at 1229 (quoting Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer).
9. See, e.g., People v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. CV 15-4181-GW, 2015 WL 4886391, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2015) (Los Angeles suit against Wells Fargo for opening accounts for 
customers without their knowledge).
10. See, e.g., People v. ConAgra Grocery Prod. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 
2017) (lead-paint litigation brought by multiple California municipalities); City of New York 
v. Keene Corp., 505 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1986), aff ‘d, 513 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (App. Div. 1987) 
(New York City asbestos-remediation litigation).
11. See, e.g., Bank of America v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017).
12. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (multiple cities and states allying 
to force EPA regulation of greenhouse gases).
13. See infra notes 46–54 and accompanying text.
14. Swan, supra note 5, at 1275 n.275; see also, e.g., In re Certified Question from the U.S. 
Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 638 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Mich. 2002) [hereinafter Certified
Question Case].
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This Article focuses specifically on the relationship between 
states and “plaintiff cities.” It contends that states should welcome 
cities’ participation in public-interest litigation and should encour-
age cities to do more of it. Cities, this Article contends, can provide 
much-needed resources to augment states’ litigative capacities in 
areas such as consumer protection, environmental protection, and 
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. What is more, cities are 
the unit of government that is closest to residents. As such, em-
powered city attorneys should be expected to bring important cas-
es involving quintessentially local concerns. Those cases may be 
those that the state would like to pursue. But because they involve 
such localized issues, they run the risk of evading state higher-ups’
attention.
To maximize the benefits of plaintiff cities, though, states can-
not simply be passive observers; instead, states should enact poli-
cies that empower cities to sue. That is true for at least two reasons. 
First, cities often lack the statutory authority to sue to enforce im-
portant statutes, such as consumer protection laws. Second, courts 
have repeatedly held that cities (unlike states) may not sue as 
parens patriae—that is, to remedy an injury affecting the “well-being 
of its populace.”15 Without the ability to sue as parens patriae, cities 
suing to protect the well-being of their citizens must sometimes pi-
geonhole their lawsuits into a legal fiction: namely, that the harm 
being inflicted on citizens is injuring the city as a body corporate. 
That strategy has sometimes proved successful, but it can only go 
so far.16 Indeed, as a result of cities’ inability to sue as parens patriae,
courts have tossed city-initiated lawsuits for want of a proper plain-
tiff.17
This Article suggests two specific means through which states 
might effectively empower cities. First, this Article endorses the 
suggestions, made by other scholars, that states can (and should) 
amend state laws to expressly allow for city enforcement.18 That 
would enable cities to stand up for their residents in court without 
having to contort their case to invent a harm to the city as the body 
corporate. Second, this Article contends that states should express-
15. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
16. See, e.g., Bank of America v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (city had cause of 
action under Fair Housing Act to sue for the economic losses suffered as a result of racially 
discriminatory housing policies).
17. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001) (city lacked 
standing in lawsuit against gun industry because it did not bring suit in a “representative 
capacity”).
18. See Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the Public 
Interest, in HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD 189, 202–04 (Ray Brescia & John Travis Mar-
shall eds., 2016).
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ly empower cities to sue on behalf of the state—thus allowing cities to 
exercise the state’s authority to sue as parens patriae. Such a delega-
tion would, in many instances, give cities standing to enforce both 
state laws and federal protections. This Article is the first to suggest 
this type of state-initiated empowerment of cities.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview 
of recent city-initiated public-interest lawsuits. It focuses on how 
states have encouraged or discouraged certain specific city-initiated 
lawsuits. Part I concludes by making the affirmative case that states 
should be supportive of city-initiated public-interest lawsuits and 
should do everything possible to empower such city suits. 
Part II surveys some of the structural obstacles that cities face 
when attempting to bring lawsuits in the public interest. These 
structural obstacles, which stem both from generally applicable 
statutes and from cities’ place in the American constitutional sys-
tem, are distinct from state “discouragement” of specific public-
interest lawsuits outlined in Part I. As Part II explains, cities, unlike 
states, often categorically lack the authority to file a lawsuit on be-
half of residents. That incapacity takes two forms. First, cities often 
lack the statutory authority to enforce state and federal laws. Sec-
ond, courts have generally held that cities lack standing to sue on 
behalf of their residents as parens patriae.
Finally, Part III provides specific suggestions as to how states can 
remove those disabilities and empower city lawsuits that seek to 
protect the public interest. As an initial matter, state legislatures 
can and should amend their laws to allow city attorneys to sue to 
enforce them. What is more, states can and should also delegate 
the authority to sue on behalf of the state to their constituent cit-
ies. Such a delegation can be effected legislatively, but—notably—
it could also theoretically be effected by a state attorney general 
(AG) who wishes to empower city-as-plaintiff suits. 
I. THE CITY AS PLAINTIFF
A. The Growing Prevalence of City-as-Plaintiff Litigation
City law offices have not historically been at the forefront of 
public-interest litigation. City attorneys traditionally have two basic 
functions: they provide counsel to city officials, and they defend 
lawsuits when the city is sued.19 And cities are sued—a lot. Because 
19. Id. at 191.
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cities provide the front-line services that directly touch residents, 
they are exposed to liability on several fronts. Cities are defendants 
when someone sustains injuries on a city bus; they are defendants 
if a child hurts herself on a play structure at a city park. Cities, 
moreover, are often defendants in lawsuits alleging misconduct by 
police. City attorneys, therefore, are regularly asked to defend 
against claims such as excessive force, unlawful police shootings, 
and abuse of authority. Perhaps as a result of that dynamic, city law 
offices have not generally enjoyed a reputation as forward-thinking
“public interest lawyers.”20
But that state of affairs is rapidly changing. City attorneys are in-
creasingly adding plaintiff’s-side work to their litigation portfolios. 
And in many cases, cities are suing not just to protect their own 
proprietary interests, but to vindicate their residents’ interests. 
Over the past few years, cities have repeatedly sued polluters to 
remediate environmental harms, corporations to vindicate con-
sumer-protection laws, and banks over racially discriminatory lend-
ing.21 Cities have filed suit against local workplaces for wage theft 
and for maintaining unsafe working conditions.22 Cities have also 
gone to court to force landlords to maintain habitable living condi-
tions23 and to compel condo-sellers to disclose relevant information 
to buyers.24
Cities are also now frequent players in major national litigation 
efforts. The City of San Francisco, for example, played a major role 
in challenging California’s ban on same-sex marriage.25 More re-
cently, in 2017 and 2018, hundreds of municipalities from across 
the country sued pharmaceutical companies over their alleged 
20. Id. at 189.
21. See supra notes 9–11.
22. See Howard Fine, Updated: City Files Suit Against Contractors Alleging Wage Theft, L.A.
BUS. J. (Nov. 13, 2014) http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2014/nov/13/city-files-suit-
against-contractors-alleging-wage-/; see also First Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive 
Relief, Restitution, and Damages, Cortez v. Choice Hotels International, Inc., No. 
RG17847671 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 2017),
http://www.oaklandcityattorney.org/PDFS/Quality%20Inn%20Complaint%201%2031%20
17.pdf. The City of Oakland and the State of California were also plaintiffs in this action.
23. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Damages, Civil Penalties, and Other Equitable Re-
lief, People v. Jaber, No. RG16829447 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, 2016),
http://www.oaklandcityattorney.org/PDFS/1620%20Fruitvale%20-%20Complaint%
20Summons%20Notice%20of%20Related%20Case.pdf. The City of Oakland was also a 
plaintiff in this action.
24. City and County of San Francisco’s Cross-Complaint Against Mission Street Devel-
opment LLC, Lehman v. Transbay Joint Powers Authority, No. CGC-16-553758 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Aug. 17, 2016), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2016/11/03/herrera-sues-developer-
failing-tell-home-buyers-millennium-tower-sinking/ (scroll to the bottom of the page and 
follow “CrossComplaint.pdf” hyperlink). The City and County of San Francisco was among 
the defendants in the original Lehman action.
25. See Proposition 8, S.F. CITY ATT’Y’S OFF., https://www.sfcityattorney.org/
tag/proposition-8/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
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roles in creating the opioid epidemic.26 On the environmental 
front, several major cities have sued oil companies to recover the 
costs associated with climate change.27 And since 2017, many Dem-
ocratic-leaning cities have challenged the Trump Administration’s
policies in court. Multiple cities, for example, sued the Trump 
Administration over its threat to defund so-called “sanctuary cit-
ies.”28 Several California cities, moreover, joined a suit brought by 
the State of California seeking to enjoin the Trump Administration 
from asking a question about citizenship on the census.29
For many cities, plaintiff’s-side lawsuits such as these are hardly 
one-offs. In fact, a number of cities have institutionalized their 
plaintiff’s-side work by creating specialized units specifically dedi-
cated to developing and bringing such cases.30 Cities boasting such 
specialized units include major coastal cities such as San Francisco, 
New York City, and Los Angeles, as well as smaller cities like Buffa-
lo, New York, and Central Falls, Idaho.31 Other cities regularly en-
gage in plaintiff’s-side work without specialized units, and some 
partner with law schools to aid in their litigation efforts.32
City-initiated lawsuits, in short, are now a prominent feature of 
the American legal landscape. And, given cities’ increasing appe-
tite to push progressive reforms, their prominence can only be ex-
pected to grow in the coming years. 
B. State Pushback Against City-Initiated Lawsuits
Despite the increased prevalence of city-initiated lawsuits, they 
are not without complications. Of particular note, city-as-plaintiff 
lawsuits sometimes sit uneasily with cities’ parent states. While 
26. Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, With Overdoses on Rise, Cities and Counties Look for 
Someone to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2017 at A18.
27. William Neuman, To Fight Climate Change, New York City Takes on Oil Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2018 at A23; John Schwartz, Judge Dismisses Suit Against Oil Companies Over
Climate Change Costs, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2018 at B4.
28. See Eli Rosenberg, Federal Judge Blocks Trump’s Executive Order on Denying Funding to 
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/politics/wp/2017/11/21/federal-judge-blocks-trumps-executive-order-on-denying-
funding-to-sanctuary-cities/. A “sanctuary city,” generally speaking, is a city that refuses to 
cooperate with federal immigration authorities. Id.
29. Alan Gomez, California Sues Trump Administration Over Census Citizenship Question, 
USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/03/
27/california-sues-trump-administration-over-census-citizenship-question/462241002/.
30. Swan, supra note 5, at 1229–30.
31. Id. at 1230 n.11.
32. Id.
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some states welcome cities’ participation in major lawsuits,33 other 
states react cautiously (or even antagonistically) to cities’ participa-
tion in public-interest litigation. On occasion, states have even tak-
en affirmative steps to stop city-initiated lawsuits in their tracks.
In some respects, state unease with city-initiated public-interest 
litigation tracks scholarly critiques of the practice. As Professor Sa-
rah Swan has written, critics raise two major “moral or political” is-
sues with city-initiated litigation.34
First, some critics suggest that city-initiated lawsuits are simply an 
end-run around cities’ inability to regulate conduct directly.35 Cit-
ies are subordinate to states in the American federal system. Thus, 
if a city passes an ordinance which deviates too far from a state’s
legislative preferences, the state can pass a law superseding that 
ordinance. Because state supremacy over municipalities is a hall-
mark of American democracy, the argument goes, a city should not 
be able to circumvent state restrictions on its regulatory authority 
by suing to achieve the same ends.36
Second, some argue that plaintiff’s-side litigation ought to be an 
arena reserved primarily for the states.37 Here, the contention is 
that states are simply better situated than cities to litigate cases of 
significant import because states represent a broader swath of in-
terested communities. States, therefore, should be plaintiffs in 
government-initiated public-interest lawsuit, not cities.38
These scholarly critiques cut to the core of real-world friction 
between cities and states. The idea that city-initiated litigation is a 
mere substitute for state regulation has been at the center of dis-
putes between cities and states over city-as-plaintiff lawsuits. The 
theory that plaintiff’s-side public-interest litigation should primari-
ly be a state function has also been a critical disagreement. These 
city-state disputes are not academic. In many instances, states have 
33. For example, as noted above, California welcomed several of its cities as co-plaintiffs 
in its lawsuit challenging the federal government’s plans to add a citizenship question to the 
2020 Census. See Gomez, supra note 29 and accompanying text.
34. Swan, supra note 5 at 1267. Professor Swan also highlights a third critique: Namely,
that city-initiated lawsuits are improper because they “bind” city residents who disagree with 
them. Id. at 1268–69. But that critique proves too much. As Professor Swan notes, that same 
critique can be leveled against any organization that engages in litigation. Id. When a corpo-
ration sues, some of its shareholders may not agree with its stance. Similarly, when a state or 
the federal government sues, some fraction of its residents will likely dissent. What is more, 
some city residents will inevitably object to litigation not just when city is the plaintiff, but 
also when it is a defendant. Id. That is particularly true in politically charged cases involving 
civil rights violations or police brutality. Taken to its logical conclusion, then, the suggestion 
that cities should not “bind” dissenting residents in litigation would apply to any litigation in 




38. See id. at 1273.
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bristled at plaintiff cities and have taken affirmative steps to un-
dermine city-led cases, either by passing laws or by litigating to stop 
these suits.
1. Legislative Preemption of City-Initiated Lawsuits
The first (and most aggressive) way in which states can under-
mine plaintiff cities is by passing laws that prohibit city-initiated lit-
igation from moving forward. States generally use this maneuver 
when a city maintains a different ideological disposition than its 
parent state, and the state wishes to stop the city’s ideological law-
suits from moving forward. To that end, states that preempt cities 
from suing on a particular topic are also likely to preempt cities 
from legislating on that topic. By preempting city-initiated suits 
through legislation, states are typically effectuating the first cri-
tique discussed above: that cities should not be able to accomplish 
through litigation what they cannot accomplish through regula-
tion. 
A state’s authority to preempt city-initiated lawsuits is well-
established. The United States Constitution establishes the United 
States as “a Nation of States,” not of cities.39 Thus, under the Consti-
tution, cities are mere “creature[s] of the state”40 and enjoy only 
the powers that states delegate to them.41 As a result, states may add 
or subtract from a city’s delegated suite of authority at any time. 
That includes taking away a city’s ability to sue certain classes of de-
fendants. 
Legislative preemption of cities’ litigation authority is thus a close 
cousin of legislative preemption of cities’ regulatory authority. State 
preemption of local law has become increasingly commonplace 
over the past decade. Legislatures across the country have passed 
laws preventing cities from enacting local ordinances pertaining to 
hot-button issues including the minimum wage, paid leave, and 
LGBTQ discrimination.42 Other states have enacted laws prevent-
ing cities from regulating ride-sharing, home-sharing, or municipal 
broadband.43
Often, laws that preempt cities from regulating conduct also 
prohibit cities from suing to enjoin that conduct. For example, 
some state laws that prohibit cities from extending anti-
39. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50 (1982) (emphasis added).
40. City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256 n.7 (5th Cir. 1976).
41. Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990).
42. See NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, supra note 6, at 1, 3–4.
43. Id.
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discrimination protections to LGBTQ people also prohibit cities 
from going into court to ensure equal treatment for that popula-
tion.44 The same is true for laws prohibiting cities from enacting 
ordinances relating to wage theft.45 So, as states move more aggres-
sively to preempt regulation, they may also move aggressively to 
preempt city-initiated litigation. The logic is readily apparent: if a
state does not permit a city to achieve a certain end via regulation, 
why should it permit that same city to achieve the same end via liti-
gation? 
The gun litigation of the late 1990s and early 2000s provides a 
case in point. Between 1998 and 2000, a torrent of major American 
cities filed lawsuits against gun manufacturers, distributors, and 
trade associations, alleging various violations of state law.46 The law-
suits had a mixed early track record of success: although some suits 
were dismissed on various grounds, others survived motions to 
dismiss.47 Yet before the gun litigation could reach its conclusion, 
several state legislatures passed laws expressly forbidding munici-
palities from suing the firearms industry. 
New Orleans’s lawsuit, for example, was stopped in its tracks 
when Louisiana passed a law that forbade any local “political sub-
division” from filing a lawsuit against virtually any actor in the fire-
arms industry.48 Georgia’s legislature passed a nearly identical law, 
dooming the City of Atlanta’s suit.49 And in Michigan, a far-
reaching suit against the gun industry filed by the City of Detroit 
survived motions for summary disposition in state court.50 That 
suit, however, was dismissed after the Michigan Legislature passed 
a law that retroactively and prospectively forbade political subdivi-
sions from filing suit against the gun industry.51
It is hardly an anomaly that states moved so swiftly and aggres-
sively to pass laws preventing city lawsuits against the gun industry. 
44. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-1-403 (2015) (local subdivisions of Arkansas cannot 
“enforce” any “ordinance, resolution, rule, or policy that creates a protected classification or 
prohibits discrimination on a basis not contained in state law”).
45. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-2-113 (2014) (prohibiting municipalities from main-
taining any “processes for the purpose of addressing wage theft”).
46. See Richard C. Ausness, Public Tort Litigation: Public Benefit or Public Nuisance?, 77 
TEMP. L. REV. 825, 840–53 (2004).
47. See id.; see also, e.g., City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 256 
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 99-02590, 2000 WL 34018326 
(Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 2000); City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. 199902590, 
2000 WL 1473568 (Mass. Super. Ct. July 13, 2000).
48. Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So. 2d 1, 6 (La. 2001); see also LA. STAT. ANN. §
40:1799 (1999)).
49. Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 543 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 2001); see also GA.
CODE ANN. 16-11-184 (1999) (repealed 2005).
50. Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 845, 854 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
51. Id. at 854–55; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.435 (2018).
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More than forty states, after all, have passed laws prohibiting cities 
from regulating firearms directly.52 State legislatures passed those 
laws after a “concerted lobbying campaign” by the deep-pocketed 
gun lobby.53 It is only logical that an interest group that can con-
vince state legislatures to defang cities’ power to regulate guns can 
(and did) convince those legislatures to defang cities’ litigation au-
thority.
States that disagree with city-initiated litigation, then, can and do 
take legislative steps to stop it entirely. As outlined below, however, 
legislative preemption is not the only way that states can disrupt 
city-initiated litigation. States can be jealous overseers of munici-
palities. Thus, even when states agree ideologically with city-
initiated lawsuits, they may still take litigation action to ensure that 
the city is not the entity pressing those suits forward.
2. Litigated Preemption of City Lawsuits
The second way that states stop city-initiated lawsuits, then, is 
somewhat different from the first. Whereas legislative preemption 
of city lawsuits is primarily motivated by ideological differences, lit-
igated preemption may occur when cities and states are ideological-
ly aligned. When states preempt their cities through litigation, it is 
not because they necessarily object to litigation per se. Instead, liti-
gated preemption sometimes comes about because a parent state 
believes that it is the more appropriate actor to carry out that liti-
gation. Litigated preemption thus tracks the second major academ-
ic critique of plaintiff cities: that plaintiff’s-side public-interest liti-
gation is a function that is simply more appropriate for states. 
Litigated preemption occurs when a state binds (or purports to 
bind) its constituent cities through litigation, a settlement, or a 
consent order. The New Hampshire case, State v. City of Dover, pro-
vides one example.54 There, New Hampshire and two New Hamp-
shire cities each filed lawsuits against manufacturers of a gasoline 
additive. The State subsequently filed suit against its cities, seeking 
a declaration that the cities’ suit must “yield to the State’s suit” and 
be dismissed.55 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire sided with 
the State. Key to the court’s ruling was that New Hampshire was su-
ing as parens patriae—that is, on behalf of its “populace.”56 Accord-
52. State Firearm Preemption Laws, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://everytownresearch.org/fact-sheet-preemption-laws/.
53. Id.
54. 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006).
55. Id. at 528.
56. Id.; see also infra Part III.B (providing overview of parens patriae).
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ingly, the court held, the State was presumed to represent not just 
its residents’ interests, but the cities’ as well.57 The court ordered 
the cities’ cases dismissed because it found “no reason to con-
clude . . . that the State will not seek to obtain full compensation 
for all communities.”58
A second example of litigated preemption came in the after-
math of a massive, multi-state settlement with the tobacco industry. 
In 1998, forty-six state AGs settled a wide-ranging set of claims 
against tobacco companies. That settlement purported to bind not 
just the states themselves, but also the states’ political “subdivi-
sions . . . including but not limited to municipalities, counties, par-
ishes, villages, [and] unincorporated districts.”59 By its terms, the 
settlement purported to bind not just the states involved in the liti-
gation, but also their constituent cities. 
At least one local unit of government attempted to circumvent 
the tobacco settlement. The year after the settlement was finalized, 
Wayne County, Michigan, filed a suit against the tobacco compa-
nies, seeking “damages incurred in providing health care services 
to smokers.”60 The companies sought to dismiss the case, arguing 
that the Michigan Attorney General—a signatory to the forty-six-
state settlement—had settled claims on behalf of Michigan’s local 
subdivisions.61 Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court sided with 
the tobacco companies. Its logic proceeded as follows: Michigan 
law gave the AG “the authority to sue on behalf of the state in mat-
ters of state interest.”62 Inherent in that authority was the authority 
to sue “on behalf of the state’s political subdivisions.”63 And inher-
ent in the authority to sue is the authority to settle. Thus, the court 
held that Michigan’s AG maintains the authority not only to liti-
gate on behalf of counties, but to bind those counties via settle-
ment as well.64
The differences between legislated and litigated preemption are 
manifest, and the high-profile gun and tobacco lawsuits provide 
57. State v. City of Dover, 891 A.2d at 531–32.
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Master Settlement Agreement § II(pp) (1998), http://ag.ca.gov/tobacco/pdf/
1msa.pdf. This Agreement was incorporated into a consent decree resolving the state AGs’
action. See Consent Decree and Final Judgment at 14, People ex rel. Lungren v. Philip Morris, 
Inc., No. J.C.C.P. 4041 (Cal Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 1998), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/tobacco/consent_decree.pdf; see also Master 
Settlement Agreement, OFF. CAL. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.ca.gov/tobacco/msa (last visited Feb. 
3, 2019).
60. Certified Question Case, supra note 14, at 411.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 414.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 415. Both the New Hampshire decision and the Michigan decision discussed 
in this Part turned on state law, so they do not bind other states.
SPRING 2019] States Empowering Plaintiff Cities 593
helpful examples of contrast. The legislated gun-lawsuit preemp-
tion reflected a belief among states that suits should not have been 
filed against the gun industry at all. With tobacco, though, both 
states and cities apparently agreed that litigation was appropriate; 
the sole question was who could bring the suit (and who could set-
tle it). The tobacco settlement thus reflected a belief that states—
not cities—bear sole responsibility for litigating major cases with 
statewide impact. 
C. The Case for State Support of City-Initiated Lawsuits
The gun litigation and the tobacco litigation each represent a 
major concern a state may have with city-initiated lawsuits. First (as 
in the gun litigation), cities might bring lawsuits that the state itself 
disagrees with. Second, (as in the tobacco litigation) a state might 
be concerned that city participation in plaintiff’s-side litigation 
could complicate states’ own comprehensive litigation efforts. Both 
of these concerns, however, are overblown and, collectively, are far 
outweighed by the benefits of city-initiated litigation. 
1. Misplaced State Concerns
As to the first concern—that cities might bring suits with which a 
state disagrees—it is of course true that cities may (and often do) 
have points of view that differ from their parent states. But city-
state divergence is a key reason that elected city governments exist 
in the first place. The American constitutional system recognizes 
only two sovereign entities: the federal government and the states. 
There is no federal legal requirement that states maintain elected 
political subdivisions at all. States maintain cities by choice precise-
ly because states recognize that local preferences may differ from 
statewide sensibilities. 
Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has made clear, cit-
ies are nothing more than creations of the state with no independ-
ent constitutional significance. That much has been clear at least
since the 1907 case Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, in which the Court 
upheld a Pennsylvania law that allowed Pittsburgh to annex its 
smaller municipal neighbors without their consent. As the Court 
explained in Hunter, cities are merely:
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmen-
tal powers of the state as may be entrusted to them. . . . The 
number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred up-
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on these corporations and the territory over which they 
shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the 
state . . . . The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify 
or withdraw all such powers . . . . repeal the [city] charter 
and destroy the corporation. All of this may be done, con-
ditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent 
of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these re-
spects the state is supreme.65
Under the Hunter doctrine, then, cities are empty vessels created 
by the state that can be filled with whatever powers and duties the 
state deems necessary. Cities can be empowered, disempowered, 
and even destroyed at the state’s whim. They are expressly subor-
dinate to the state—no different from any other state “agency”
such as a road commission or a health department.66 Municipali-
ties, in short, exist only at the pleasure of the state. And they can 
take whatever form a state chooses.
States could thus theoretically administer local functions—trash 
pickup, road maintenance, and so on—through unelected state 
agencies who answer directly to the state government. But no states 
are organized in that way. Instead, states have universally opted to 
empower self-governing, separately elected local bodies. This deci-
sion reflects an understanding that people in Chicago have differ-
ent views than people in Peoria, and that the outcome of statewide 
elections should not dictate everything that happens on the 
ground in cities and neighborhoods. 
So, the fact that cities may file lawsuits with which the state disa-
grees (or which the state would not have bothered to bring on its 
own accord) is a natural outgrowth of states’ decision to govern 
through independent, elected local bodies. Indeed, when cities sue 
against their parent states’ wishes, it is often because the city is try-
ing to alleviate a problem of quintessentially local concern. The 
city-initiated gun lawsuits are illustrative. The city officials who au-
thorized those suits were likely more politically liberal (and thus, 
likelier to support gun control) than the state leaders who 
squashed them. Fundamentally, though, those suits were filed by 
cities because gun violence is a scourge that is concentrated in ur-
ban centers. The plaintiff cities were doing precisely what cities are 
set up to do. They were addressing a local issue, for local resi-
dents—even though statewide politicians, most of whom repre-
sented areas with lower levels of gun violence, may have disagreed.
65. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
66. See id.
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One might still object that isolated political subdivisions should 
not be able to countermand state policy through litigation. Imag-
ine, for example, that a major corporation—the largest employer 
in the state—negligently pollutes the drinking water supply in a ti-
ny township. Should that township really be able to sue the corpo-
ration, putting at risk the state’s economic well-being and, poten-
tially, the livelihood of its workers?
The short answer to that question is “yes.” In this respect, argu-
ments against state preemption of city litigation are far less trench-
ant than arguments that could be made in favor of state preemp-
tion of city regulation. There are good arguments that, in certain 
instances, states should be able to prohibit cites from enacting lo-
cal laws that would harm the state as a whole.67 It would be prob-
lematic, for example, if a township were to impose a spurious regu-
lation that would force the state’s biggest employer to leave the 
state. 
But litigation is different. When a city brings a lawsuit, it general-
ly needs to identify some existing law that has been violated in or-
der to recover. If that law has indeed been broken, and if the city 
has standing to sue, it would be passing strange to say that a state 
should be able to veto that lawsuit.
The second concern—that plaintiff’s-side litigation should be 
the sole province of states—is equally unavailing. State officials 
who argue against city-initiated lawsuits assert that they are better 
situated to bring such lawsuits for at least three reasons. First, they 
contend that states have the capacity to push for a “comprehensive 
solution” to major problems like the opioid epidemic. Second, 
they claim that they are better able to equitably allocate any mone-
tary recovery to the parts of state government that need it.68 Third, 
they note that many cities use outside counsel (typically working 
on a contingency basis) to bring plaintiff’s-side suits and that states 
are able to bring suits without paying outside counsel.69
All of those arguments are overstated at best. It is true, of course, 
that there are fewer states than cities, so states can theoretically co-
ordinate national litigation efforts against common defendants
67. Take, for example, a state that wishes to shift its electrical generation to alternative 
energy. Many people want cleaner energy, but many also object to wind turbines in their 
communities. State preemption of local laws restricting such turbines could smooth those 
problematic incentives. For more on progressive preemption of local laws, see Nolan Gray, 
The Positive Power of Preemption, CITYLAB (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/
2017/08/the-positive-power-of-preemption/536241/.
68. See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Cities Vs. States: A Looming Battle For Control Of High-Stakes Opi-
oid Litigation, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/
03/28/cities-vs-states-a-looming-battle-for-control-of-high-stakes-opioid-litigation/.
69. See, e.g., id.
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more easily. But the challenges of coordinating multistate litigation 
efforts—such as the tobacco litigation—are hardly insubstantial. 
Indeed, it is far from clear that coordinating up to fifty geograph-
ically and politically disparate states is significantly easier than co-
ordinating multiple political subdivisions. 
As to the equitable allocation point, it is simply untrue that 
states generously pass along to cities the resources earned from 
plaintiff’s-side litigation. The tobacco cases are illustrative. Though 
the tobacco litigation settled for $246 billion, very little of that 
money ultimately went to cities.70 That is true despite the fact that 
cities, counties, and other local units of government (who run 
hospitals, ambulances, and outreach services) incurred significant 
financial losses as a result of tobacco’s adverse health consequenc-
es.71
Finally, the argument that cities are likely to use contingency-fee 
plaintiff’s attorneys is inapposite. To be sure, in some cases (e.g., 
the tobacco litigation) government entities win huge sums of mon-
ey and pay large percentages to contingency-fee attorneys. But in 
other cases (e.g., the gun litigation) government entities win next 
to nothing—and pay next to nothing for the costs of litigation. Use 
of contingency counsel thus allows government entities to take on 
litigation risk and sue monied corporations without outlaying sig-
nificant taxpayer resources. And notably, cities are not the only en-
tities that use contingency counsel. States also have regularly used 
contingency counsel—in the tobacco litigation and otherwise—
which has furthered states’ ability to conduct plaintiff’s-side litiga-
tion in the first place.72
2. The Affirmative Case for State Support of 
City-as-Plaintiff Litigation
Thus, though states may feel some trepidation about city-
initiated lawsuits, that trepidation is largely unfounded. To take 
matters further: states should affirmatively welcome the city-as-
plaintiff trend. That is true for at least four reasons.
70. Id.; see also 15 Years Later, Where Did All The Cigarette Money Go?, NPR (Oct. 13, 2013), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/10/13/233449505/15-years-later-where-did-all-the-cigarette-
money-go.
71. See Fisher, supra note 68.
72. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND NATIONAL 
POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 99–102 (Univ. Press of Kan. 2015); see also Law-
yers Win Hefty Tobacco Case Fees, CNN (July 30, 1999, 12:55 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/30/tobacco.fees.01/.
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First, cities are better situated to address local issues and can act 
more nimbly to do so. Cities exist to be responsive to local con-
cerns, and they often sue to remediate quintessentially local harms. 
Sometimes, as in the case of the gun lawsuits, that means that cities 
sue because they bear the brunt of the damage related to a nation-
al, hot-button topic. But that is hardly the typical case. Most often, 
city-initiated lawsuits are aimed at alleviating circumscribed harms 
that take place entirely within city limits. For example, cities regu-
larly file suit against companies for illegal disposal of trash73 and 
improper storage of hazardous materials;74 against owners of rental 
units for neglect75 and tax delinquency;76 and against companies 
for causing specific, localized environmental harms.77
Those local issues concern (or should concern) the state as well. 
After all, a city’s residents are also residents of a state. The safety of 
Spokane’s drinking water is thus not just an issue that concerns the 
City of Spokane: it concerns the State of Washington as well.78 Simi-
larly, California has an interest in the safety of Oakland’s buildings, 
and the proper disposal of hazardous waste in Los Angeles.79 Yet,
because such issues are localized, it makes sense that cities—which, 
again, are created by the state to address local issues—should be the 
plaintiff in any suit to address them. After all, issues of local con-
cern will, in all likelihood, first come to the attention of cities, 
simply because of cities’ “relative closeness to local citizens.”80
Second, city-initiated lawsuits can alleviate financial pressure on 
states. Most notably, cities often have an on-the-ground investigato-
ry apparatus—a local police force, for example—that is costly for 
the state to replicate.81 And when a local unit of government sues 
to remedy a localized harm, it is one fewer issue that the state must 
deal with. 
Cities can also help alleviate state resource constraints when 
states engage in major, complex litigation. State AGs are often 
73. See, e.g., Ryan Parker, Albertsons to Pay $3.4 Million to Settle Illegal Disposal Case, L.A.
TIMES (June 24, 2014, 6:16 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-albertsons-
settlement-20140624-story.html.
74. See, e.g., Arezow Doost, Commerce Sues Property For Poorly Disposed Asbestos, CBS 11 
(May 16, 2011, 10:00 PM) http://dfw.cbslocal.com/2011/05/16/commerce-sues-complex-
for-poorly-disposing-of-asbestos/.
75. See supra note 23.
76. See, e.g., Chad Livengood, Detroit Suing 700 Property Investors for Unpaid Taxes, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUSINESS (Aug. 28, 2017, 9:17 PM) http://www.crainsdetroit.com/
article/20170829/news/637586/detroit-suing-700-property-investors-for-unpaid-taxes.
77. See, e.g., City of Spokane v. Monsanto Co., 237 F. Supp. 3d 1086 (E.D. Wash. 2016).
78. See id.
79. See supra notes 23, 75 and accompanying text.
80. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 721 
(2011).
81. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 68.
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woefully understaffed and outgunned when they litigate against 
major corporations. For example, when Rhode Island sued the 
lead paint industry, “there were more attorneys working for the de-
fense than in the entire attorney general’s office.”82 If properly co-
ordinated, adding city attorneys to the litigation efforts can allevi-
ate such pressure. 
Of course, cities’ resources are also stretched thin, so state AGs 
should not count on city assistance in the mine-run of cases. But in 
cases where cities affirmatively choose to get involved in litigation, 
there is opportunity for them to add capacity to the state’s appa-
ratus. 
Third, the positive effects of city-as-plaintiff suits often radiate 
outwards and benefit communities across the state. City-initiated 
suits sometimes result in settlements or judgments that expressly re-
quire statewide change. Take Los Angeles’s lawsuit against the Al-
bertson’s grocery store chain for illegal dumping in violation of 
California’s Hazardous Waste Law. The case ended up settling to 
the tune of $3.4 million.83 As part of that settlement, Albertson’s
was required implement a formal environmental compliance pro-
gram in all its California stores (not just those in Los Angeles).84
And even without specific statewide injunctions, city lawsuits can 
affect statewide behavior. Take, again, the Albertson’s example. 
Even without the injunctive relief, the amount of money Albert-
son’s was forced to expend to settle the lawsuit may well have been 
sufficient to deter Albertson’s from further violations of California 
law. That deterrence would presumably take place in stores across 
California, not just in Los Angeles.85
Fourth, city-initiated lawsuits can serve as models for future cases 
brought by the state. As compared to states, cities are likelier to be 
on the leading edge of innovative legal strategies because it is typi-
cally easier for a city to obtain political consensus about the need 
to bring a suit than it is for a state.86 State actors, after all, have to 
take stock of a wide array of rural and urban constituencies. Cities, 
by contrast, are more circumscribed and are generally more ho-
mogeneous politically. When city law offices are encouraged to 
pursue creative litigation, states can thus sit back and watch them 
82. Swan, supra note 5, at 1281.
83. See Parker, supra note 73.
84. Morris, supra note 18, at 197.
85. Indeed, there do not appear to have been any further enforcement actions against 
Albertson’s related to violations of California’s hazardous waste laws since 2014.
86. See Swan, supra note 5, at 1272–73.
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file innovative, longshot lawsuits—and wait to see whether those 
suits bear fruit before jumping into the litigation fray themselves.87
City-initiated lawsuits, in short, are beneficial not just to the city 
and its residents, but to the city’s parent state, as well. Therefore, 
states should affirmatively support city-as-plaintiff litigation and 
proactively seek to remove barriers to such suits. 
II. OBSTACLES TO CITY-INITIATED LAWSUITS 
If a state wishes to encourage city-as-plaintiff litigation, its active 
support for plaintiff cities is not just desirable, it is crucial. Despite 
the increased prevalence of city-initiated litigation, significant bar-
riers to such lawsuits remain. That is true for two reasons. First, un-
like states, cities often lack the authority to enforce important state 
and federal statutes. Second, unlike states, cities lack the authority 
to sue as parens patriae to remedy injury to their citizens.
These obstacles operate to keep cities out of court, but in differ-
ent ways. A city’s inability to sue as parens patriae means that there 
are cases in which a city lacks standing to file a lawsuit—despite the 
fact that its residents were harmed—because the city as a corporate 
body was not itself “among the injured.”88 That disability, at least in 
federal court, is jurisdictional. When a city lacks standing, it means 
that the city is not “sufficiently adversary to a defendant to create 
an Art. III case or controversy.”89
By contrast, when a city lacks a statutory right to sue, it means 
that the city lacks a “cause of action” under the relevant statute itself.
That question is distinct from the question of whether a city has 
standing. Even if a plaintiff has been injured by a statutory viola-
tion, it still must demonstrate that Congress (or the Legislature) 
provided it a cause of action to enforce the violation of that law.90
In other words, standing hinges on whether a plaintiff has been in-
87. At the time of this Article’s writing, a dynamic along these lines was playing out in 
the opioid litigation. Municipalities have been on the leading edge of bringing suit against a 
wide range of opioid-related companies, with states following in their footsteps. See Jared 
Hopkins & Andrew Harris, The Legal Engine Driving More Than 800 Lawsuits Against Opioid 
Makers, INS. J. (July 24, 2018), https://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/national/2018/07/24/495880.htm (explaining how a county spearheaded the strate-
gy to sue not just opioid manufacturers, but distributors, as well).
88. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
89. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979).
90. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (“Like substantive federal law it-
self, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”)
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jured in the real world. A cause of action, by contrast, hinges on 
whether the statute at issue provided the plaintiff a right to sue.91
A plaintiff must have both standing and a cause of action to pro-
ceed with a case. The fact that a plaintiff has standing does not au-
tomatically give that plaintiff a cause of action.92 Nor (at least in 
federal court) can a statute granting a plaintiff a cause of action 
automatically give that plaintiff standing. “Injury in fact,” the Su-
preme Court has emphasized, “is a constitutional requirement, and 
it is settled that Congress cannot erase Article III’s standing re-
quirements by statutorily granting the right to sue to a plaintiff 
who would not otherwise have standing.”93
A further note: When cities lack statutory authority to bring a 
suit, that disability operates in both state and federal court. No
matter the venue, cities simply cannot sue under the relevant stat-
ute. The ramifications of cities’ inability to sue as parens patriae,
however, are a bit more complicated. Technically (as discussed in 
further detail below), parens patriae is a doctrine of federal court 
standing that allows states the authority to sue on behalf of their 
residents. Because state courts often have more lenient standing 
requirements than federal courts,94 there is theoretically no reason
that the federal parens patriae doctrine should apply in state courts. 
In practice, however, state courts “routinely” apply and adopt the 
federal parens patriae standard.95 Cities’ inability to sue as parens pa-
triae, then, is a disability that, as a practical matter, has ramifica-
tions in both federal and state court.
A. Cities’ Lack of Statutory Authority 
The United States Congress and state legislatures have passed 
numerous laws in recent decades that allow for enforcement by 
state AGs. On the federal level, states are perhaps most frequently 
granted enforcement powers in the field of consumer protection. 
A hodge-podge of federal statutes grant state AGs the power to sue 
to force compliance with a wide variety of laws on topics ranging 
91. See id.
92. See Davis, 442 U.S. at 239 n.18.
93. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016).
94. See, e.g., Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 693–94
(Mich. 2010) (noting that the Michigan Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, 
lacks a case-or-controversy standing requirement, and accordingly there is “no textual basis”
for “importing the federal case-or-controversy requirement into Michigan law”).
95. Patrick Hayden, Note, Parens Patriae, the Class Action Fairness Act, and the Path For-
ward: The Implications of Mississippi Ex Rel. Hood v. Au Optronics Corp., 124 YALE L.J. 563, 
571–72 (2014).
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from flammable fabrics to email spam to telemarketing.96 What is 
more, the 2012 Dodd-Frank Act—a sweeping consumer-protection 
law—sets out perhaps the most comprehensive federal-state “dual-
enforcement” scheme in the United States.97 Under Dodd-Frank, 
both the federal Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 
and state attorneys general may sue to enforce the law’s prohibi-
tion on “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or practice[s],” and to 
enforce rules promulgated by the CFPB.98
But federal laws that empower states typically do not empower 
cities. Dodd-Frank, for example, grants enforcement power only to 
a state’s “attorney general (or the equivalent thereof).”99 Other 
statutes are worded similarly. A federal law regulating packaging of 
household substances grants enforcement powers only to the “at-
torney general of a State, or other authorized State officer.”100 A
law regulating sports agents allows for “state” enforcement, if the 
“attorney general of a State” so directs.101 The specific, unequivocal 
inclusion of state attorneys general in such laws—combined with 
the omission of other state or sub-state actors—leaves little room 
for municipal enforcement.102
State laws are similar. Every state has its own consumer-
protection laws, and the vast majority of those laws vest general en-
forcement powers in the state attorney general.103 Just seven of 
those laws provide for city or county enforcement.104
As Professor Kathleen Morris wrote, the failure to empower cit-
ies via consumer protection laws means that cities are unable to 
“halt illegal and unfair corporate practices within their jurisdic-
tions at the earliest stages.”105 Instead, such practices can be 
stopped (if at all) only when (1) a state AG decides to enforce the 
law, or (2) consumers sue directly. Compounding matters, con-
sumer-initiated lawsuits might be unavailable or unviable in several 
96. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 698, 708–10
(2011).
97. Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After Dodd-
Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. 115, 117–18 (2013).
98. 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2018) (prohibiting “unfair, deceptive, or abusive act[s] or prac-
tice[s]); id. § 5552 (granting state AGs the authority “to enforce provisions of this title”).
99. Id. § 5552.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1477 (2018).
101. Id. § 7804 (2018).
102. This is not to say that federal law never allows municipal suits. The Clean Air Act, for 
example, includes a “citizen suit” provision, which allows any aggrieved “person” to bring a 
suit, and further defines “person” to include a “State, municipality, [or] political subdivision 
of a State . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (2018) (emphasis added).
103. Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement of State and Federal Consumer Protec-
tion Laws, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1903 app. (2013).
104. Id. at 1906.
105. Morris, supra note 18, at 203.
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circumstances. If consumers sign binding arbitration agreements, 
for example, they may not be able to sue in a court of law.106 Simi-
larly, if consumers sign an enforceable class-action waiver, there is 
often little incentive for them to sue. Absent the possibility of a 
class action, a consumer who is cheated out of a small-to-moderate 
amount of money is unlikely to bother to pursue litigation—much 
less find an attorney who is willing to do so.107
Thus, in many cases, the only realistic judicial recourse is for a 
state AG to take up a case. And state AGs may lack the time, incli-
nation, or capacity to do so. The lack of local enforcement mecha-
nisms in state and federal law severely limits the efficacy of those 
laws and often prevents cities from stopping unlawful conduct 
within city limits. 
B. Cities’ Inability to Sue as Parens Patriae
A further obstacle to city-initiated lawsuits comes as a result of 
courts’ refusal to recognize cities’ authority to sue as parens patriae.
That means that cities—unlike states—are unable to sue to vindi-
cate an injury suffered by their residents; instead, they may sue on-
ly to vindicate an injury suffered by the city as a body corporate.
The concept of parens patriae—Latin for “parent of [the] coun-
try”—dates back at least to English common law.108 At common law, 
parens patriae was a doctrine that gave the Crown the legal respon-
sibility to act on behalf of children and mentally incapacitated per-
sons.109 After the Revolution, parens patriae was incorporated into 
the American constitutional system. Instead of being vested in a 
single sovereign, the rights and responsibilities to act as parens pa-
triae accrued to both the federal government and the states, be-
cause both were seen as “sovereign” successors to the Crown.110
Over time, parens patriae also evolved into a theory of federal
court standing under which a “parent” state may sue to remedy in-
106. Id. at 192.
107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing) (“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation 
for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”).
108. Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
109. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982)
(quoting JOSEPH CHITTY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CROWN 155 
(1820)).
110. See Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 
136 U.S. 1, 57 (1890) (parens patriae is “inherent in the supreme power of every state”); see 
also In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir. 1973)
[hereinafter Vehicle Air Pollution Case].
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jury to its residents.111 Although states have exercised parens patriae 
standing since at least the turn of the twentieth century,112 the doc-
trine was most fully fleshed out in the 1982 case Snapp v. Puerto Ri-
co. In that case, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sued a group of 
Virginia apple growers who had allegedly discriminated against 
hundreds of Puerto Rican residents who were seeking seasonal 
employment.113 Emphasizing Puerto Rico’s interest in preventing 
discrimination against its citizens, the Court upheld the Common-
wealth’s authority to sue as parens patriae and seek remedy on be-
half of its citizens.114
Though a state’s authority to sue as parens patriae is well-
established, the concept of parens patriae is something of an anoma-
ly in the federal judicial system. Article III of the United States 
Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “cases” and “con-
troversies.”115 To ensure that an actual case or controversy exists, 
the Supreme Court has emphasized that federal plaintiffs themselves 
must have suffered a “concrete and particularized” injury-in-fact.116
It is not enough, the Court has explained, for a plaintiff to demon-
strate an abstract “injury to a cognizable interest.”117 Rather, a 
plaintiff must “be himself among the injured.”118 That doctrine, at 
first blush, is in severe tension with parens patriae standing. After all, 
when a state sues as parens patriae, it is not suing for an injury that 
the state has incurred. Instead, the state is suing to remedy a harm 
that has been visited on its residents.
Recognizing the tension between parens patriae and Article III 
standing, the Court in Snapp explained that it is not enough for a 
state to simply assert that some of its residents were injured. In-
stead, a state seeking to sue as parens patriae must allege that an in-
jury to its citizens infringed a “quasi-sovereign” interest of the 
state.119 The Court declined to delineate precisely what constitutes 
a “quasi-sovereign” interest—forthrightly noting that the concept 
was “a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a simple or ex-
act definition.”120 The Court did explain, however, that “quasi-
111. See Snapp, 458 U.S. at 600–01.
112. See Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900); see also Snapp, 458 U.S. at 602 (refer-
ring to Louisiana v. Texas as the “first” recognition of parens patriae “by this Court”).
113. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 597–98.
114. Though Puerto Rico is not a state, the Court held that “the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico is similarly situated to a State in this respect,” and that it “has a claim to repre-
sent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that of any State.” Id. at 
608 n.15.
115. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
116. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
117. Id. at 563 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972)).
118. Id. (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 735).
119. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
120. Id.
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sovereign interests” are generally those that the State has in the 
“well-being of its populace.”121 A quasi-sovereign interest is thus dis-
tinct from a state’s sovereign interest in, for example, securing its 
borders.122 It is also distinct from a state’s proprietary interests in its 
own property or money.123 Fundamentally, a “quasi-sovereign” in-
terest is simply an interest that stems from a state’s concerns for
residents’ well-being. 
In the decades that followed Snapp, states have asserted a broad 
array of “quasi-sovereign” interests to establish parens patriae stand-
ing. Perhaps most prominently, parens patriae standing played a ma-
jor role in the multi-state tobacco litigation in the 1990s, where an 
early case vindicated the State of Texas’ quasi-sovereign interest in 
defending “the economy of the State and the welfare of its peo-
ple.”124 States have also successfully used parens patriae standing to 
sue on behalf of residents who were victims of discrimination on 
the basis of race,125 age,126 disability,127 and HIV-positive status.128
And states have repeatedly invoked parens patriae in lawsuits based 
on corporate misdeeds. States have, for example, invoked parens 
patriae standing to bring consumer-protection lawsuits.129 They have 
also successfully invoked parens patriae in the antitrust context, as-
serting a quasi-sovereign interest in “securing the integrity of the 
marketplace.”130
Cities, however, have had far less luck in their attempts to sue as 
parens patriae. Federal courts have consistently held that cities may 
not sue as parens patriae. The rationale? Cities—unlike states—are 
not formal “sovereigns.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for 
example, has repeatedly rejected cities’ attempts to sue as parens 
patriae,131 reasoning that because parens patriae was originally vested 
in “the English Sovereign,” formal sovereignty is a prerequisite to 
121. Id. at 602.
122. Id. at 601.
123. Id.
124. Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997).
125. See, e.g., New York v. Peter & John’s Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 809 (N.D.N.Y. 
1996).
126. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 90 (D. Mass. 1998).
127. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Vacco v. Mid-Hudson Med. Grp., 877 F. Supp. 143 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).
128. See, e.g., Support Ministries For Persons With AIDS, Inc. v. Village of Waterford, 799 
F. Supp. 272 (N.D.N.Y. 1992).
129. See Illinois v. SDS W. Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1050 (C.D. Ill. 2009) (citing con-
sumer-protection cases).
130. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. Microsoft Corp., 428 F. Supp. 2d 537, 545 (S.D. Miss. 
2006).
131. See, e.g., City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2004); Colo-
rado River Indian Tribes v. Town of Parker, 776 F.2d 846, 848 (9th Cir. 1985); Vehicle Air 
Pollution Case, supra note 110, at 131.
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suing as parens patriae.132 And because the United States Constitu-
tion recognizes only “the federal government and the states” as 
“sovereigns,” the Ninth Circuit held that “political subdivisions”—
cities, counties and the like—“cannot sue as parens patriae.”133 Simi-
larly, the Fifth Circuit has held that cities, as mere “creature[s] of 
the state,” cannot exercise the same parens patriae powers as their 
parent states.134 Multiple district courts have reached the same con-
clusion.135
Cities have fared only slightly better in state courts. State courts, 
of course, may impose more lenient standing requirements than 
federal courts, because state courts are not bound by the federal 
Constitution’s “case or controversy” requirement. To that end, 
state courts have occasionally held (or suggested) that cities enjoy 
authority to sue on behalf of their residents as parens patriae.136 A
New York court, for example, held that New York City had the au-
thority to sue as parens patriae because its city charter granted it the 
authority to sue on behalf of its residents.137 But such cases are few 
and far between. More frequently, state courts brusquely reject lo-
cal government entities’ attempts to sue as parens patriae, citing 
federal precedent and noting only that cities and counties “lack 
the element of sovereignty” necessary to maintain a parens patriae 
suit.138
Cities’ inability to sue as parens patriae makes it difficult for cities 
to bring a straightforward public-interest suit based on a harm that
has been visited on its residents. Instead, cities must either figure 
out a way in which wrongdoing harms the city as a body corporate 
or forego a lawsuit entirely. In Michigan, for example, a court re-
jected a township’s attempt to sue to protect a local lake “from pol-
lution and its effects” because the township itself had not suffered a 
“specific injury” that was “distinct from those of the general pub-
132. Vehicle Air Pollution Case, supra note 110, at 131.
133. Id.
134. City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield, 529 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1976).
135. See Brazoria County v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. G-04-691, 2005 WL 
1364837, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 7, 2005); Prince George’s County v. Levi, 79 F.R.D. 1, 4 (D. 
Md. 1977); Bd. of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 566 (E.D. Va. 1976).
136. See, e.g., City of New York v. Wyman, 321 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1971), rev’d on other 
grounds, 281 N.E.2d 180 (N.Y. 1972); see also Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Re-
dressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 365–68 (2006).
137. Wyman, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 712.
138. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm’rs, 718 P.2d 235, 241 (Colo. 
1986); Capital View Fire Dist. v. County of Richland, 377 S.E.2d 122, 123 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1989); see also City of Compton v. Bunner, 243 Cal. Rptr. 100, 119 (Ct. App. 1988) (ordered 
not published); Coldsprings Township v. Kalkaska Cty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 755 N.W.2d 
553, 555 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); County of Lexington v. City of Columbia, 400 S.E.2d 146, 
147 (S.C. 1991); Tuma v. Kerr County, 336 S.W.3d 277, 282 (Tex. App. 2010).
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lic.”139 Similarly, a gun lawsuit brought by the City of Bridgeport, 
Connecticut, was rejected because the city could not identify a suf-
ficiently “direct” injury to the city.140 For these reasons, as Professor 
Sarah Swan noted, standing presents perhaps the “biggest doctri-
nal hurdle” for plaintiff cities.141
* * *
In sum, as compared to states, cities face two main obstacles to 
bringing public-interest lawsuits. First, a number of state and fed-
eral statutes expressly empower state AGs to file suit but omit any 
mention of city attorneys. Second, at least in federal court, cities 
have generally been denied the authority to sue as parens patriae.
III. STATES EMPOWERING CITIES: HOW STATES CAN REMOVE
BARRIERS TO CITY-AS-PLAINTIFF LAWSUITS
To review: Cities across the country are demonstrating an in-
creased appetite for plaintiff’s-side public-interest litigation.142 De-
spite skepticism from some corners, this trend should be seen as a 
mostly positive development from the perspective of states.143 Yet 
city-initiated lawsuits face several hurdles, including cities’ inability 
to sue as parens patriae and the fact that cities often lack a statutory 
cause of action.144
What, then, can states do to help cities overcome these hurdles? 
Quite a lot. States can change their laws to provide cities with a 
cause of action to enforce various statutes. States, moreover, can 
delegate to cities the authority to act on behalf of the people of the 
state (and thus, to sue as parens patriae). And, at least in many 
states, both of these steps can be accomplished either legislatively 
or through the AG’s office. 
A. Providing Cities a Statutory Cause of Action
The first and most straightforward thing that states can do to fa-
cilitate city-initiated lawsuits is to provide cities with an express 
cause of action to enforce those laws. This idea, though not widely 
139. Coldsprings Township, 755 N.W.2d at 556.
140. See Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98, 129 (Conn. 2001).
141. Swan, supra note 5, at 1252.
142. See supra Part I.A.
143. See supra Parts I.B; I.C.
144. See supra Part II.
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implemented, is hardly new or novel. Indeed, in seven states, cities 
and counties are already provided some authority to sue to enforce 
state consumer-protection laws.145
In one of those states—California—local enforcement of state 
law has proved quite successful. California’s consumer-protection 
law expressly grants cities with populations exceeding 750,000 the 
authority to file suit to enforce the law “in the name of the people 
of the State of California.”146 California’s consumer-protection law 
is robust, broadly prohibiting any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent 
business act or practice.”147 The California Supreme Court has giv-
en that language an expansive reading, holding that the law pro-
hibits “anything that can properly be called a business practice and 
that at the same time is forbidden by law.”148 What is more, Califor-
nia also grants cities the authority to sue to abate public nuisances 
on behalf of the “people of the state of California.”149 Again, “pub-
lic nuisance” is broadly defined: it includes any nuisance that “af-
fects . . . an entire community or neighborhood, or any considera-
ble number of persons.”150
California’s largest cities have made effective use of their formi-
dable litigation authority. The City of San Francisco has filed law-
suits on topics ranging from climate change to lender abuse to un-
lawful arbitration practices to juvenile health-care.151 Los Angeles 
waged a successful battle against unlawful dumping of hazardous 
waste.152 And a consortium of Californian cities and counties ob-
tained a massive judgment requiring corporations to abate lead 
paint from California homes.153 The success of that lawsuit was 
145. See Morris, supra note 103, at 1911.
146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2018).
147. Id. § 17200.
148. Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527, 539 (Cal. 
1999).
149. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 731 (West 2018).
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2018).
151. See generally Kathleen S. Morris, San Francisco and the Rising Culture of Engagement in 
Local Public Law Offices, in WHY THE LOCAL MATTERS: FEDERALISM, LOCALISM, AND PUBLIC 
INTEREST ADVOCACY 51 (Kathleen Claussen et al. eds., 2010). See also Complaint for Public 
Nuisance, People ex rel. Herrera v. BP P.L.C., No. CGC-17-561370 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Sept. 19, 
2017), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2017/09/19/san-francisco-oakland-sue-top-five-oil-gas-
companies-costs-climate-change/ (scroll to the bottom of the page and follow “San Francisco 
complaint.pdf” hyperlink) (action brought by the San Francisco City Attorney alleging pub-
lic nuisance related to climate change).
152. Morris, supra note 18, at 196–97.
153. See Michael Hiltzik, In Landmark Ruling, Court Orders Paint Companies to Pay to Clean 
Lead Paint Out of California Homes, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017, 1:55 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-lead-paint-ruling-20171115-story.html.
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somewhat unexpected. Many other jurisdictions previously tried to 
sue the lead-paint industry, and nearly all failed.154
In light of these successes, Professor Kathleen Morris—herself a 
veteran of the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office—has called for 
other states to amend their own organic statutes to allow enforce-
ment by city officials.155 Unfortunately, Professor Morris’s sugges-
tion has not been taken up by state legislatures, many of whom (as 
noted earlier) have taken an increasingly adversarial approach to 
cities generally.156 Yet, the California model is well worth replicat-
ing. California’s largest cities have used their litigation authority to 
win victories that affect all citizens of the State.157 The lead-paint 
suit, in particular, is an example of a risky suit that paid tremen-
dous dividends—precisely the type of suit that state governments 
should encourage cities to pursue. And there have been few, if any, 
discernible downsides to California empowering its cities. Empow-
ering cities to enforce consumer-protection laws does not, for ex-
ample, appear to have undermined the business climate in Cali-
fornia. California, empowered city attorneys and all, now ranks as 
the fifth-largest economy in the world.158
B. Delegating Parens Patriae Standing
In addition to granting cities the authority to sue to enforce 
state laws, states can—and should—delegate to cities the authority 
to sue as parens patriae, thus opening a pathway for cities to sue in a 
representative capacity.
The notion that states can empower cities to sue as parens patriae 
may seem farfetched at first blush. After all, every federal court 
that has considered the question has flatly rejected the idea that 
cities can sue as parens patriae.159 So, too, have the vast majority of 
state courts. Their logic is straightforward: Parens patriae accrues 
only to “sovereigns.”160 The only two “sovereigns in our constitu-
154. Multiple cities, in multiple other states, have attempted to sue the lead paint indus-
try—with little to no success. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 
128–29 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 113 
(Mo. 2007) (en banc).
155. Morris, supra note 103, at 1906.
156. See supra Part I.B.1.
157. See supra notes 154–56 and accompanying text.
158. Kieran Cochran, California’s Economy Is Now the 5th-Biggest in the World, and Has Over-
taken the United Kingdom, BUS. INSIDER (May 5, 2018 7:09 AM), https://www.businessinsider.
com/california-economy-ranks-5th-in-the-world-beating-the-uk-2018-5.
159. See supra notes 134–38 and accompanying text.
160. Vehicle Air Pollution Case, supra note 110, at 131.
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tional scheme” are “the federal government and the states.”161 Cit-
ies are neither of those entities. Accordingly, cities cannot sue as 
parens patriae.162
But even though cities themselves lack formal “sovereignty,” noth-
ing prevents cities from exercising a state’s sovereign authority to 
sue as parens patriae. That is true (somewhat ironically) because of
cities’ subordinate role in the federal constitutional system. Recall 
that, under longstanding Supreme Court doctrine, cities are noth-
ing more than creations of the state, with no independent constitu-
tional significance. As the Court held in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh,
the “number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon 
[cities] . . . rests in the absolute discretion of the state.”163 Cities are, at 
bottom, sub-state agencies, conceptually identical to any other 
agency chartered by the state. 
That point is critical, because state-directed litigation is always 
carried out by a sub-state agency of the state’s choosing. A state, 
the Supreme Court has recognized, is nothing more than “a politi-
cal corporate body” that “can act only through agents.”164 That is 
obviously true when a state litigates. A state, as a “corporate 
body,”165 cannot walk, talk, or write legal briefs. Accordingly, states 
can litigate only through the designated agents of their choosing. 
To be sure, as the Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]hat agent is 
typically the State’s attorney general.”166 Yet the Court has also rec-
ognized that a state may also empower “other officials to speak for 
the State in federal court.”167
So when a state chooses to litigate, it is up to the state to choose 
who gets to speak for it. Courts will not generally second-guess the 
state’s choice of a representative.168 That doctrine is fully consistent 
with the principle that the state is the relevant unit of government 
in the American constitutional system, and sub-state actors—AGs 
and executive-branch departments, as well as cities and counties—
have no independent constitutional significance.169 They are, in the 
words of Hunter, merely “convenient agencies for exercising such 
of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to 
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 207 U.S. 161, 168 (1907) (emphasis added).
164. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 288 (1885).
165. Id.
166. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 710 (2013).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50 (1982) (“[W]e are a Nation 
of States . . . .”).
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them.”170 A state can thus imbue with litigation authority any sub-
state actor it chooses without running afoul of federal law.
Accordingly, nothing in federal law prevents a state from en-
trusting to its cities the authority to “speak for the State in federal 
court.”171 And when a city steps into the state’s litigation shoes, it 
should (depending on the scope of its delegated powers) be per-
mitted to sue as parens patriae. In such a situation, the city would be 
speaking not as a municipal corporation, but as an arm of the 
state. In that respect, it should be treated no differently from a 
state AG who claims the authority to sue as parens patriae.
It may seem odd for a territorially bound city to exercise litiga-
tion authority that belongs to the state as a whole. But states already
divide their litigating units into regional units. Many state AGs 
maintain regional offices.172 And when lawyers from one of those 
regional offices file suit on behalf of the state, they are, presuma-
bly, permitted to sue as parens patriae.173 The analysis should be no 
different for state-empowered cities. In the federal system, after all, 
cities really are nothing more than territorially bound state admin-
istrative agencies, albeit agencies whose leaders are democratically 
elected.
To be sure, any real-world arrangement in which a city is dele-
gated the authority to sue as parens patriae will likely involve the city 
using that power where a defendant primarily harms city resi-
dents.174 But that is of no moment. Nothing in the doctrine of 
parens patriae requires a state to demonstrate that the complained-
about harm affects a geographically diverse cross-section of state 
residents. Indeed, federal courts already entertain hyper-local 
parens patriae suits. The New York Attorney General’s Office, for 
example, brought a parens patriae suit alleging that a single Syra-
cuse nightclub had engaged in racial discrimination against eight 
170. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
171. Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 710. Of course, state law may impose some restraints (e.g., 
by specifying in a state constitution that an attorney general is the sole authorized legal rep-
resentative of a state). In such cases, a state constitutional amendment would be required to 
effect a delegation to cities.
172. See, e.g., Division of Regional Offices, N.Y. ATT’Y GEN., https://ag.ny.gov/legal-
recruitment/division-regional-offices (last visited Feb. 3, 2019); Office of the Attorney General: 
Regional Offices, OFF. VA. ATT’Y GEN., https://www.oag.state.va.us/9-about/268-regional-
offices (last visited Feb. 3, 2019).
173. See, e.g., New York v. Peter & John’s Pump House, 914 F. Supp. 809 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(parens patriae suit brought by Syracuse-based assistant attorney general).
174. That said, nothing (at least in federal law) would prevent a state from empowering 
a city to sue on behalf of residents across the state. A state can modify “all” of a city’s powers, 
Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178, so nothing in federal law would prohibit, for example, the State of 
Louisiana from giving the City of New Orleans power to sue as parens patriae on behalf of all 
residents of Louisiana.
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patrons.175 Empowering the Syracuse city attorney to bring similarly 
constrained lawsuits on behalf of the state would not run afoul of
the parens patriae doctrine.
A state that wishes to empower city-initiated lawsuits, then, can 
do so simply by enacting laws that delegate to cities the authority to 
sue as parens patriae. Because a state maintains “absolute discretion”
on the “number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred 
upon” cities,176 a delegation of parens patriae authority might be 
broad or narrow. A state could expansively provide its cities with 
unfettered parens patriae authority, granting cities standing wherev-
er there is an articulable quasi-sovereign interest. Alternatively, a 
state could limit that delegation to suits involving a particular sub-
ject matter or to cities that exceed a certain population thresh-
old.177 To avoid difficulties with coordination, a state might also 
provide that a city may sue as parens patriae only in the event the 
state AG declines to press such a suit. 
It falls outside the scope of this Article to speculate as to each 
and every way in which a state might delegate its parens patriae au-
thority. And, of course, a state legislature wishing to make such a 
delegation may have constraints imposed on it by the state consti-
tution. Yet nothing in federal law prohibits a willing state from im-
buing its cities with parens patriae standing. 
C. The Role of State Attorneys General
Given the fraught relationship between states and cities, all of 
this may appear to be armchair theorizing. Many state legislatures 
are increasingly antagonistic to local units of government. States 
are now regularly passing laws that preempt cities from even legis-
lating on certain topics. In this climate, is it realistic to expect 
those same state legislatures to empower cities to litigate?
Perhaps not. But even without legislative consent, a state AG 
may well be able to empower plaintiff cities. State AGs, after all, are 
the actors who are authorized to carry out the duties this Article 
contemplates could be delegated to cities. As noted, state AGs are 
empowered to enforce a wide variety of state and federal laws.178
State AGs, moreover, are generally given authority to sue as parens 
175. Peter & John’s Pump House, Inc., 914 F. Supp. at 812.
176. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
177. This is arguably what California has done, albeit in the context of state statutes. Re-
call that California grants cities with more than 750,000 people the authority to sue to en-
force consumer protection laws “in the name of the people of the State of California.” CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (West 2018).
178. See supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
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patriae.179 Thus, a state AG could directly delegate to cities the litiga-
tion authority discussed in this Part without legislative action—so 
long as state law permits it. Such a delegation could turbocharge 
cities’ litigation capabilities.
And in many states, the AG’s office can indeed delegate its au-
thority. Most commonly, state statutes provide that AGs may dele-
gate their “duties” and “powers” to employees: assistant attorneys 
general, deputy attorneys general, and the like.180 But many states 
also authorize the AG to delegate the powers of her office to “spe-
cial assistant attorneys general”—outside lawyers who are not em-
ployed by the state.181 Express statutory authorization to empower 
outside counsel, moreover, is often not necessary. Even in states 
where the legislature has not expressly permitted the appointment 
of “special assistant attorneys general,” courts have held that the 
AG’s office has the inherent authority to delegate its authority to 
outside lawyers.182
Importantly, few states have imposed any real limits on the types 
of authority a state AG can delegate.183 To be sure, a state AG can-
not assign away a responsibility that the state’s constitution re-
quires her to personally fulfill.184 Thus, where a state constitution 
provides that an elected AG must fulfill the duties of an incapaci-
tated governor,185 the AG cannot delegate that duty to another. But 
when it comes to litigation, state AGs have significant discretion to 
delegate to outside counsel. State AGs, for example, “often” dele-
gate to private plaintiffs’ lawyers the authority to press suits as 
parens patriae186 even though those private lawyers are not “sover-
eign,” and are not even employed by the sovereign state.
179. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 710 (2013) (“[A State’s] agent is typically 
the State’s attorney general.”).
180. 7 AM. JUR. 2D ATT’Y GEN. § 11 (2018); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 180.140 (2018); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 62 (McKinney 2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.060 (2018).
181. 7 AM. JUR. 2D ATT’Y GEN. § 11 (2018); see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 2505 
(2018); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-9-2 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-11-5 (2018).
182. State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 649 (W. Va. 2013).
183. The process by which a state attorney general can delegate authority to outside 
counsel, however, varies. In Maryland, for example, an attorney general may hire outside 
counsel only “with the written approval of the Governor.” MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T § 6-
105 (West 2018).
184. In re Title, Ballot Title & Submission Clause, & Summary with Regard to a Proposed 
Petition for an Amendment to the Constitution of the State of Colo. Adding Subsection (10) 
to Sec. 20 of Art. X (Amend TABOR 25), 900 P.2d 121, 124 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (“The 
only limitation placed on the delegation of duties by . . . the attorney general is a prohibi-
tion against the attorney general delegating any of his or her [personal] constitutional du-
ties.”).
185. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. V § 26.
186. Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp., 876 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (S.D. Miss. 
2012); see also Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956, 962 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (authori-
ty to sue as parens patriae upheld in a case where Texas was represented by outside counsel).
SPRING 2019] States Empowering Plaintiff Cities 613
If AGs can delegate their powers to private attorneys, it stands to 
reason that they should also be able to delegate those powers to 
city attorneys. The precise delegation mechanism would vary by 
state. But in general, a state AG should be able to designate one or 
more city attorneys as a “special assistant attorney general” capable 
of suing as parens patriae or of wielding a cause of action reserved 
for state AGs. Alternatively, an AG could delegate authority to a 
city attorney only for particular issues or lawsuits that directly per-
tain to the city. Indeed, at least one state AG has done something 
similar with sub-state units of government. Using nothing more 
than a memorandum of understanding, Colorado’s AG delegated 
to the University of Colorado’s Counsel the authority to litigate, on 
behalf of the AG, all state cases involving the University of Colora-
do.187
Of course, any city attorneys who are delegated such authority 
would have to abide by relevant ethics and conflict-of-interest rules. 
But those should not be particularly onerous. Courts have ruled, 
for example, that criminal defense attorneys may simultaneously 
maintain appointments as special assistant attorneys general—so 
long as they are not directly involved in prosecutions.188 By that 
light, a city attorney who is designated a special assistant attorney 
general should not have a conflict, provided that none of his work 
is directly adverse either to the city or the state. 
A public-interest minded AG, then, can provide an end-run 
around a legislature that is hesitant to empower plaintiff cities. Of 
course, in many instances, a legislature that is hostile to plaintiff 
cities is likely to be paired with a state AG who is similarly hostile. 
But not in all cases. Due in part to partisan gerrymandering, the 
number of statewide urban votes are often not reflected propor-
tionately in a statewide legislature.189 It is therefore quite possible 
for a state legislature to be dominated by rural members who are 
relatively antagonistic to increased city authority, but for an elected 
state AG to be more sympathetic to urban interests. The state AG’s
office thus provides another powerful tool by which states can em-
power plaintiff cities. 
187. Booth v. Univ. of Colorado, 64 P.3d 926, 927 (Colo. App. 2002), aff’d, 78 P.3d 1098 
(Colo. 2003).
188. See, e.g., Hamm v. State, 913 So. 2d 460, 482 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002); People v. Rog-
ers, 382 N.E.2d 1236, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
189. See, e.g., Barry Yeoman, How Gerrymandering Silenced North Carolina’s Cities, CITYLAB 
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/how-gerrymandering-silenced-
north-carolinas-cities/550406/.
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CONCLUSION
From a state’s perspective, the increased prevalence of city-
directed public-interest litigation is a welcome development. Such 
litigation protects state residents and is relatively cost-effective. For 
that reason, states should encourage cities to vigorously pursue 
public-interest litigation on behalf of their citizens. Thankfully 
(and somewhat ironically) cities’ subordinate status allows states to 
vest cities with significant litigation authority—up to, and includ-
ing, the authority enjoyed by the state itself.
